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No. 20070730-SC 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEMANDA LILLIAN MECHAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
SEAN D. FRAZIER AND DAVID L. JOHNSON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Brief of Appellants 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an 
order certifying two questions of state law to this Court. This Court accepted 
the certified questions in an order entered October 31, 2007. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (West Supp. 2007), this Court has original 
jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a federal court. 
Issues Presented 
1. Immunity from suit 
Utah's governmental immunity act requires a claimant to file a notice 
of claim identifying the nature of the asserted claim before filing suit. This 
requirement is a jurisdictional precondition to filing suit. The act also 
requires that, to bring a personal capacity claim against a state officer, a 
claimant must allege that the employee acted with fraud or malice. Where a 
claimant fails to identify the nature of her claim as a personal capacity claim 
- by not alleging fraud or malice in her notice of claim - has she failed to 
meet a jurisdictional precondition, thereby rendering the state officers 
immune from suit? 
A. Standard of Review 
When a federal court certifies questions of state law, this Court 
answers "the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying 
dispute." In re Kurtz, 2004 UT 71, <|[6, 99 P.3d 793. 
2. Allegation of fraud or malice 
To bring a claim against a state officer personally, a plaintiff is required 
to allege in her notice of claim that the state officer acted with fraud or 
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malice. This Court has adopted the reasoning of the Utah Court of Appeals 
that a notice of claim was insufficient when it merely alleged facts from which 
malice could be inferred but did not expressly allege fraud or malice. Should 
this Court follow its precedent and continue to require that an express 
allegation of fraud or malice be included in a notice of claim to properly 
identify a personal capacity claim? 
A. Standard of Review 
When a federal court certifies questions of state law, this Court 
answers "the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying 
dispute." Kunz, 2004 UT 71 at <|[6. 
Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
The following provisions are attached as Addendum 2 to this Brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
Lemanda Mecham sued Utah Highway Patrol Troopers Sean Frazier 
and David Johnson in federal district court. Aplt. App. at 1-2, 3, 10-19. 
Mecham raised one federal claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and seven state law 
claims. Aplt. App. at 14-18. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Aplt. App. at 20-37. The federal district court denied the 
defendants' motion, and defendants challenged that denial in an interlocutory 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Aplt. App. 
at 4, 71-73, 74-75. The appeal was brought under the collateral order 
doctrine, which grants the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory 
appeal of a denial of an immunity claim. From that appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
certified two questions of state law to this Court. 
2. Course of the Proceedings in the Federal Courts 
Lemanda Mecham filed this action against Utah State Highway Patrol 
Troopers Sean Frazier and David Johnson in 2004. Aplt. App. at 1-2. 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Aplt. App. at 2. While denying the 
motion to dismiss as to the federal claim, the district court dismissed the 
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plaintiffs state claims because the complaint was insufficient as to those 
claims. Aplt. App. at 2-3. The plaintiff was given time to file an amended 
complaint. Aplt. App. at 3. Mecham filed an amended complaint. Aplt. App. at 
3, 10-19. The amended complaint raised one federal claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 
and seven state law claims. Aplt. App. at 14-18. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Aplt. App. at 20-37. The district court denied the 
defendants' motion and defendants appealed. Aplt. App. at 4, 71-73, 74-75. 
The Tenth Circuit entered an order on September 11, 2007, certifying 
two questions of state law to this Court.1 This Court accepted the certified 
questions on October 31, 2007. 
3. Disposition in the Federal Courts 
The Tenth Circuit appeal has been abated pending resolution of the 
questions certified to this Court. In a related appeal, Mecham u. Frazier, — 
F.3d —, 2007 WL 2608624 (10th Cir. 2007), Docket No. 05-4297, the Tenth 
footnote three of the Tenth Circuit's certification order incorrectly 
states that the new version of Utah's immunity act requires merely an 
allegation of negligence to bring a personal capacity claim against a 
government employee. The act, however, expressly limits personal capacity 
suits to only those injuries resulting from fraud or willful misconduct, the use 
of alcohol or drugs, or perjury. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-202(3)(c). 
5 
Circuit reversed the federal district court's denial of qualified immunity on 
the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, concluding that the defendants did not violate 
Mecham's constitutional rights. 
Statement of Facts 
In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleged one federal and seven state 
law causes of action against the defendants. Aplt. App. at 14-18. Defendants 
Frazier and Johnson were "troopers and/or employees of the Utah Highway 
Patrol." Aplt. App. at 11 <J5. The defendants' 
authority to act was derived from Utah state law and their own 
authority and/or commands and directives of their superiors. All 
of the acts of the individuals and entities listed in the preceding 
paragraphs were performed under color of the laws, statutes, 
ordinances, of the State of Utah and the regulations, policies, 
customs, and usages [of] defendants' respective law enforcement 
agencies." 
Aplt. App. at 11f7. 
In her notice of claim, Mecham did not expressly allege that the 
defendants acted with either fraud or malice. Aplt. App. at 33-36 (attached as 
Addendum 1). She alleged that they used "unreasonable and excessive force 
in arresting her" and that they "were negligent in their use of force which 
negligence caused her permanent and chronic injury." Aplt. App. at 33. 
Mecham's notice of claim repeatedly stated that Frazier and Johnson had 
6 
been negligent or unreasonable, but not that they had acted with either fraud 
or malice. Aplt. App. at 35. 
Summary of the Argument 
Utah's governmental immunity act confers on state officers immunity 
from suit when a plaintiff fails to comply with the act's notice of claim 
requirements. Those requirements are a jurisdictional precondition to suit, 
thereby barring the lawsuit altogether when not met, not merely immunizing 
a state officer from liability. 
To bring a claim against a state officer personally, a plaintiffs notice of 
claim must specifically aver that the state officer acted with fraud or malice. 
It is not enough to allege facts from which fraud or malice can be inferred. 
Because plaintiff did not specifically allege fraud or malice in her notice of 
claim, her state law claims are jurisdictionally barred. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Because its notice of claim provision imposes a jurisdictional 
precondition to filing suit, Utah's immunity act confers on state 
officers immunity from suit, not merely immunity from liability, when 
that jurisdictional precondition is not met 
This Court's order accepting certified questions of state law, asks the 
parties to answer this question posed by the Tenth Circuit: Does the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act2 confer to state officers an immunity from suit 
(immediately appealable) or merely an immunity from liability (not 
immediately appealable)? 
The Tenth Circuit's use of "immediately appealable" refers to 
interlocutory appeals within the federal system. An interlocutory appeal may 
be taken as a matter of right, under the collateral order doctrine, from a 
federal district court's denial of a claim of immunity from suit: 
Pursuant to the federal collateral order doctrine, we have subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear "appeals of orders denying motions to 
dismiss where the motions are based on immunity from suit." 
State law governs the scope of the immunity at issue (i.e., 
whether the immunity is "immunity from suit" or merely 
"immunity from liability"). 
2At the time of Mecham's alleged injury, the immunity act was codified 
at Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 through -38. Because Mecham's alleged injury 
arose before July 1, 2004, this action continues to be "governed by the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 2004 
Laws of Utah ch. 267, § 48. 
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Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med. v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist, 353 F.3d 832, 
837 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that court will look to substantive state law in 
determining the nature and scope of claimed immunity) (citations omitted). 
See also Decker v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that denial of claim for immunity from liability, as opposed to 
immunity from suit, is not collateral order that is immediately appealable). 
No such doctrine exists under state law, where interlocutory appeals are not 
allowed as a matter of right. See Utah R. App. P. 5. 
Because the immunity act's notice of claim provision imposes a 
jurisdictional precondition to filing suit, the act confers on state officers 
immunity from suit, not merely immunity from liability, in cases where that 
jurisdictional precondition is not met. Defendants' motion to dismiss was 
based on Mecham's failure to strictly comply with the immunity act's notice of 
claim provisions. This Court has held that the immunity act should be strictly 
applied so as to preserve sovereign immunity: 
In analyzing the parties' positions, we must keep in mind 
that the legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as 
essential to the protection of the state in rendering the many and 
ever increasing number of governmental services. . . . In a 
prefatory section of the Act, the legislature made this abundantly 
clear: Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function. . . . This . . . 
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indicate [s] an intention that the act be strictly applied to preserve 
sovereign immunity. 
Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original). 
This strict application standard is why this Court has repeatedly ruled 
that strict compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Rushton v. 
Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,1119, 977 P.2d 1201; Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
P.2d 245, 249-50 (Utah 1988). Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 
480 (Utah 1975). 
We have held that the Governmental Immunity Act must be 
strictly applied. As we explained in Epting v. State, the 
codification of sovereign immunity mandates stringent 
enforcement, since it is through the Governmental Immunity Act 
that the "legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as 
essential to the protection of the state in rendering the many and 
ever increasing number of governmental services." 
Hall v. Utah State Dept ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, fU, 24 P.3d 958 (citations 
omitted). In Hall, this Court held that the requirements of the notice of claim 
provision of the immunity act had to be precisely complied with. Id. at ^23 ("In 
other words, where the government grants statutory rights of action against 
itself, any conditions placed on those rights must be followed precisely/'). 
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An action brought under the immunity act is a claimant's exclusive 
remedy and a claimant may only sue a government employee personally in 
certain circumstances: 
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action 
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee 
for an injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive 
remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action 
or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave 
rise to the claim unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud 
or malice; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) (emphasis added). 
The act further contains a global notice of claim provision that operates 
as a jurisdictional precondition to bringing any suit. See Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36, <|[18, 977 P.2d 1201 (holding that failure to file notice of 
claim that complied with all of the immunity act's requirements deprived the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction). The notice of claim provision applies to all 
claims brought against a governmental entity or a government employee: 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written 
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
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regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (emphasis added); see also Thomas v. Lewis, 
2001 UT 49, fll, 26 P.3d 217 ("Indeed, by its terms, the notice of claim 
provision is global in application. It therefore applies to all actions for any 
claim it describes unless the statute or law authorizing the specific action at 
issue expressly, or by necessary implication, indicates otherwise.") (emphasis 
added). This Court has noted that, "[w]hen applying the notice provision in the 
past, we have called for strict compliance to the Immunity Act before 
determining that the State waived its immunity. Strict compliance constitutes 
adherence to all of the relevant provisions outlined in the Immunity Act." Li v. 
Univ. of Utah, 2006 UT 57, f8, 144 P.3d 1142 (emphasis added). 
Among other things, the notice of claim must set forth the nature of the 
claim asserted: "The notice of claim shall set forth: (i) a brief statement of the 
facts; (ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the 
claimant so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3). To properly 
state the nature of the claim asserted, a claimant must identify whether any 
claims are brought as personal capacity claims against the state employees 
themselves. The proper filing of a notice of claim is not merely a statute of 
limitation but "is a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit." 
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Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992). 
This court stated that "[w]e have previously addressed questions regarding . . . 
failure to set forth the nature of the claim asserted . . . . In each of those 
instances, we have dismissed claims when they fail to follow the unambiguous 
language of the Immunity Act." Li, 2006 UT 57 at \lb. 
Defendants' motion to dismiss was based on this jurisdictional 
precondition. Defendants argued that Mecham's notice of claim did not 
properly identify the nature of the claim asserted - personal capacity claims 
against the officers - because she failed to expressly aver fraud or malice. If 
Mecham indeed failed to satisfy this jurisdictional precondition, she was barred 
from filing suit and defendants were not merely immunized from liability. As 
set forth below, Mecham's notice of claim failed to satisfy this jurisdictional 
precondition and the interlocutory appeal was therefore proper under the 
collateral order doctrine as an appeal from a denial of a claim of immunity from 
suit. 
2. A claimant must specifically aver fraud or malice in her notice of claim 
to satisfy the immunity act's notice of claim requirements. 
The second question posed by the Tenth Circuit is: Does the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act require that a Notice of Claim against state 
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officials in their individual capacity expressly aver "fraud" or "malice"? 
This Court held in Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49,1120, 26 P.3d 217, that, 
to bring a personal capacity claim, a claimant must expressly allege fraud or 
malice. Moreover, in Thomas this Court expressly agreed with the reasoning of 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Straley v. Halliday, 2000 UT App 38, 997 P.2d 
338, where a notice of claim was deemed insufficient for failing to allege fraud 
or malice, even though the notice of claim contained facts from which malice 
might have been inferred. Thomas at 1(14. 
Straley involved a statutory claim against a state judge. The statute 
authorized a forfeiture action against any judge who wrongfully and willfully 
refused to allow a writ of habeas corpus. Straley's notice of claim alleged that 
the judge had violated the statute by wrongfully and willfully denying 
plaintiffs petition for a writ. The notice did not, however, include an express 
allegation that the judge had acted with fraud or malice. Id. at ^15. A second, 
untimely and defectively served, notice of claim did expressly allege that the 
judge acted with fraud or malice. Id. at \1Q. The Court of Appeals concluded 
that the failure of first notice of claim to expressly allege that the judge acted 
with fraud or malice was jurisdictional in nature and deprived the courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction over Straley's claims. 
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Straley's first notice of claim failed to assert that Judge Halliday 
acted with fraud or malice in denying his petition. As mentioned 
above, Straley's action cannot be maintained against Judge 
Halliday personally absent the allegation of fraud or malice. Thus, 
although the first notice of claim was sufficient in terms of the first 
complaint, Straley's action as framed in that complaint must fail. . 
. . Because no action may be maintained against Judge Halliday 
personally absent the allegation of fraud or malice, this variance 
"is much more than a mere expansion or amplification of what was 
alleged in the notice," and the first notice of claim is insufficient for 
the action as framed in the amended complaint. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 
1990)). 
Significantly, it was not enough that Straley's first notice of claim had 
alleged facts from which malice may have been inferred - that the judge acted 
wrongfully and willfully. Those allegations were insufficient absent an express 
allegation of malice. Without an allegation that a state employee acted with 
fraud or malice, the causes of action against the employee are in a 
representative capacity, and not against the employee personally. Such a 
claim is the equivalent of suing the government and not the employee. Straley's 
second notice of claim "rectified this problem" by asserting that the judge had 
"acted with fraud or malice." Straley at 'ft 16. And though Straley's second notice 
would have been sufficient simply by adding an express allegation of fraud or 
malice, it was untimely and improperly served and therefore also deficient. Id. 
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In Thomas, this Court expressly stated its agreement with the Utah 
Court of Appeals' reasoning in Straley. See Thomas, 2001 UT 49 at \1A (stating 
that "[w]e agree with the reasoning of that case"). Further, in reiterating that a 
claimant "must additionally allege fraud or malice" to bring a personal capacity 
claim,3 this Court again cited to Straley. Thomas at H20 n . l l (also citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)). 
Unless Mecham can demonstrate that Thomas and Straley should be 
reversed, a claimant's notice of claim must expressly allege fraud or malice to 
adequately state the nature of her asserted claim. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
393, 398-99 (Utah 1999) ("[t]hose asking us to overturn prior precedent have a 
substantial burden of persuasion"). Mecham's claims are jurisdictionally barred 
because she did not specifically allege that the Troopers acted with fraud or 
malice. Because Mecham's notice of claim failed to strictly comply with the 
requirements of Utah's immunity act, the federal district court was without 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mecham's state law claims. 
3
 This is as opposed to being sued in a representative capacity where 
the actual party in interest would be the government entity. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-4(3) (West 2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah's immunity act confers on state officers an immunity from suit 
when a plaintiff fails to comply with the act's notice of claim requirements. 
When a plaintiff fails to comply with those requirements, her lawsuit is barred 
because she has failed to meet a jurisdictional precondition to bring suit. The 
state officers plaintiff seeks to sue are therefore immune from suit and not 
merely immune from liability. 
To bring a claim against a state officer personally, a plaintiffs notice of 
claim must specifically aver that the state officer acted with malice, not merely 
allege facts from which malice can be inferred. Because plaintiff did not 
specifically allege fraud or malice in her notice of claim, her state law claims 
are jurisdictionally barred under Utah's governmental immunity act. 
Dated this lv "clay of January, 2008. 
J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS to the following this Z ^ r d a y of 
January, 2008: 
Cory B. Mattson 
9677 South 700 East, #D 
Sandy, UT 84070 
tf^— 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Mecham's Notice of Claim (Aplt. App. 33) 
Cory BMattson (#9292) 
480 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
801-983-0093 
Attorney for Claimant 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
TO: THE UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
and THE STATE OF UTAH: 
This letter serves as a Notice of Claim against the State of Utah and the above listed agencies 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 12. 
IDENTITY OF CLAIMANT 
Name: Lamanda Lillian Mecham 
Address: 1457 East 11245 South 
Sandy, UT 84092 
TIME AND LOCATION OF INCIDENT 
The incident or loss occurred on SR 15 (Interstate Highway 15) near mile post 322 on the 
southbound side of the highway. The date was February 23,2003. The time was between the hours 
of 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. The citation number assigned is U67766279. The case number is 03-
03-0344. 
NATURE OF CLAIMS 
This is a claim for the torts of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution against Trooper Sean D. Frazier 
and Trooper David L. Johnson. Ms. Mecham asserts that the troopers used unreasonable and 
excessive force in arresting her. Ms. Mecham asserts that the troopers were negligent in their use 
of force which negligence caused her permanent and chronic injury. Ms. Mecham also asserts her 
claim for violation of her right to be free of unreasonable seizure of her person under Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Though Ms. Mecham disputes that she is 
required by the laws of the State of Utah to give notice of claims brought under § 1983 of the federal 
Civil Rights Act, Ms. Mecham also asserts her claim for violation of her civil rights guaranteed 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure of her person. 
Notice of CI aim 
January 16,2004 
Page 2 
PERSONS INVOLVED 
The persons involved were Trooper Sean D. Frazier, Trooper David L. Johnson, and 
Lamanda Lillian Mecham. Ms. Mecham's mother, Tisha Mecham, witnessed parts of the 
conversations between Lamanda and Trooper Frazier over the cell phone. A witness of the battery 
and arrest was Sean Scheer, a tow truck operator. 
At all times material hereto, Troopers Frazier and Johnson were employees of the Utah 
Highway Patrol, an agency of the Utah Department of Public Safety which is a department of the 
State of Utah. Troopers Frazier and Johnson were acting within the course and scope of their 
employment as state highway patrol troopers when committing all acts herein alleged 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
On February 23, 2003, Ms. Mecham was driving southbound on Interstate 15 near mile 
marker 322 when she was pulled over by a car which appeared to be a highway patrol vehicle. An 
individual later identified as Trooper Frazier approached her car and told her that she was being 
pulled over for driving 5 miles per hour over the speed limit and for failing to wear her seatbelt. 
Ms. Mecham was surprised at this charge because she felt she was operating her vehicle at 
a reasonable speed and noticed that she was being passed by many other vehicles during the time that 
she was pulled over. Trooper Frazier then requested her license and registration for her car. She 
produced her Arizona driver's license and the registration for the car. Trooper Fiazier then went 
back to his vehicle to check the license and registration. 
Some moments later, Trooper Frazier again approached Ms. Mecham's car and told her that 
her license was suspended and that he was going to impound the car. She became very distraught 
and feared for her safety. She began to doubt the identity of the officer because she knew of no basis 
for her license to be suspended and feared that Trooper Frazier may have been using a pretext to get 
her out of her car. During the time that she was speaking with Trooper Frazier, she was contacted 
on her cell phone by her mother, Tisha Mecham, who she had called earlier. Ms. Mecham was very 
fearful for her safety and worried that she would lose the connection with her mother if she hung up 
so she continued to speak with her mother while the Trooper Frazier waited. During the 
conversation, Trooper Frazier left and went back to his car. 
Tisha Mecham could hear the conversation on the other end of the line between Lamanda 
Mecham and Trooper Frazier. She began to worry for her daughter's safety and began driving 
toward the location of the stop. Mrs. Mecham advised her daughter to stay in her car and ask the 
officer to call for backup so that she would be reassured of the trooper's identity. 
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When Trooper Frazier returned to the car again, he told Ms. Mecham that he was going to 
have her car towed to impound and that he was going to arrest her for interfering with an officer. 
Ms. Mecham was speaking with her mother at the time of this conversation with Trooper Frazier and 
repeatedly asked him to speak with her mother. It was at that point that Trooper Frazier demanded 
that she get out of her car so that he could put her under arrest. She again asked him to speak with 
her mother to explain the charges. He refused and deployed his pepper spray in her face. He then 
forcibly and violently dragged her out of the car and threw her down on the road surface to the rear 
of her car. He handcuffed her and then dragged her farther off the road. Lamanda was very scared 
and, at one point, lost consciousness. 
Trooper Frazier requested an ambulance and Lamanda was taken to the hospital where she 
was treated for pepper spray and released. She was later booked into the Davis County Jail. 
In the weeks and months after the incident, Lamanda had severe pain and discomfort in her 
neck and upper shoulders. She has sought medical attention and has been told that her condition is 
a result of being thrown to the ground and handcuffed during the arrest. She continues to experience 
chronic discomfort and pain from this condition. 
AH charges against her arising from the incident were later dropped. 
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT & NEGLIGENCE 
Troopers Frazier and Johnson unreasonably arrested Ms. Mecham which constituted an 
unreasonable seizure of her person in violation of the 4,h Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. They also committed the civil torts of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, abuse 
of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Ms. Mecham alleges 
that the troopers' actions were unreasonable and were calculated to physically injure, intimidate, and 
terrorize her. The troopers were negligent in their use of force which caused permanent physical 
injury to Ms. Mecham. The troopers violated Lamanda Mecham*s state and federal civil rights to 
the extent that they seized her person contrary to law. 
NATURE OF INJURIES AND OTHER DAMAGES 
Lamanda Mecham has suffered chronic orthopedic injury to her neck and back as a result of 
the ex cessi ve and unreasonable force used against her by Troopers Frazier and Johnson. By dragging 
her out of her car and throwing her to the ground, the troopers injured the connective tissues in her 
neck, which injuries continue to cause pain and discomfort. The deployment of the pepper spray, 
handcuffing and other rough handling during the arrest caused pain, aching, and general discomfort. 
Lamanda Mecham has also suffered mental and emotional distress as a result of the incident 
to the extent that she has experienced anxiety and sleeplessness. 
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She also suffered lost wages as a result of missing time at her employment. Ms. Mecham 
was additionally had to pay the towing and impound fees to recover her vehicle. Because of the 
charges leveled against her by Trooper Frazier, Ms. Mecham was forced to retain a criminal defense 
attorney to def&nd her and, thereby, incurred attorney fees. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2004. 
'i±M 
CORY BMATTSOn 
Attomewfor Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING & MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CLAIM was sent via certified 
mail to the following, postage prepaid, this /V^day of January, 2004. 
Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Robert L. Flowers, Commissioner 
Department of Public Safety 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 
Rick Wyss 
Utah Department of Public Safety 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Determinative Statutes 
FORMER GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
§ 63-30-3 Immunity of governmental entities 
from suit 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided m 
this chapter, all governmental entities are lm 
mune from suit for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, and 
from an approved medical nursing or other 
professional health care clinical training pro 
gram conducted in either public or pnvate facil-
ities 
(2) Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are unique 
or essential core governmental functions and, 
notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provi-
sions of Section 63-30-10, governmental enti 
ties political subdivisions, and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from the implementation of 
or the failure to 
(a) implement measures to control the causes 
of epidemic and communicable diseases and 
other conditions significantly affecting the pub-
lic health or necessary to protect the public 
health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local 
Health Departments, 
(b) investigate and control suspected bioter 
ronsm and disease as set out in Title 26 Chap 
ter 23b Detection of Public Health Emergencies 
Act and 
(c) respond to a national state or local emer 
gency a public health emergency as defined in 
Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration by the 
President of the United States or other federal 
official requesting public health related activi 
ties 
(3)(a) For the purposes of this chapter only 
the following state medical programs and ser 
vices performed at a state owned university hos 
pital are unique or essential to the core of 
governmental activity in this state and are con 
sidered to be governmental functions 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospi 
tal or physician because of the high risk nature 
of the patient's medical condition, 
(u) high risk care or procedures available in 
Utah only at a state owned university hospital 
or provided in Utah only by physicians em 
ployed at a state owned university acting in the 
scope of their employment 
(m) care of patients who cannot receive ap 
propriate medical care or treatment at another 
medical facility in Utah, and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed 
a
* a state owned university hospital or by physi 
cians employed at a state-owned university act 
m g in the scope of their employment that a 
court finds is unique or essential to the core of 
governmental activity in this state 
(b) If any claim under this Subsection (3) 
exceeds the limits established in Section 
63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess 
claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legis-
lature under Title 63, Chapter 6 
(4) The management of flood waters and oth-
er natural disasters and the construction, re-
pair, and operation of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are im-
mune from suit for any injury or damage result-
ing from those activities 
(5) Officers and employees of a Children's 
Justice Center are immune from suit for any 
injury which results from their joint intergov-
ernmental functions at a center created in Title 
62A, Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services 
Laws 1965, c 139, § 3, Laws 1978, c 27, 
§ 2, Laws 1981, c 116, § 2, Laws 1984, c 33, 
§ 1, Laws 1985, c 93, § 1, Laws 1991, c 15, 
§ 1, Laws 1991, c 248, § 7, Laws 2003, c 3, 
§ 5,eff May 5, 2003 
See, now, § 63-30d-201 
§ 63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as 
admission or denial of liability—Effect of waiv-
er of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of 
employee—Limitations on personal liability 
(l)(a) Nothing contained in this chapter, un-
less specifically provided, may be construed as 
an admission or denial of liability or responsi 
bihty by or for governmental entities or their 
employees 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this 
chapter consent to be sued is granted and 
liability of the entity shall be determined as if 
the entity were a private person 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is 
created by any waiver of immunity in this chap 
ter, nor may any provision of this chapter be 
construed as imposing strict liability or absolute 
liability 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed 
as adversely affecting any immunity from suit 
that a governmental entity or employee may 
otherwise assert under state or federal law 
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection 
(3)(b), an action under this chapter against a 
governmental entity or its employee for an inju 
ry caused by an act or omission that occurs 
dunng the performance of the employee s 
duties, within the scope of employment, or un 
der color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive 
remedy 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any 
other civil action or proceeding based upon the 
same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission 
gave rise to the claim, unless 
(I) the employee acted or failed to act through 
fraud or malice, 
STATE AFFAIRS 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the 
conditions set forth in Subsection 
63-30-36(3)(c); or 
(iii) in a judiciahor administrative proceeding 
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, 
upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by 
law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony 
material to the issue or matter of inquiry under 
this section. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a representa-
tive capacity if the act or omission complained 
of is one for which the governmental entity may 
be liable, but no employee may be held person-
ally liable for acts or omissions occurring dur-
ing the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority, unless it is established that: 
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to 
fraud or malice; 
(b) the injury or damage resulted from the 
conditions set forth in Subsection 
63-30-36(3)(c); or 
(c) in a judicial or administrative proceeding 
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, 
upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by 
law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony 
material to the issue or matter of inquiry under 
this section. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 4; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 3; Laws 1983, c. 129, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 76, 
§ 1, Laws 2002, c. 206, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002. 
See, now, § 63-30d-202. 
§ 63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contrac-
tual obligations 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived as to any contractual obli-
gation. Actions arising out of contractual rights 
or obligations shall not be subject to the re-
quirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Divi-
sion of Water Resources is not liable for failure 
to deliver water from a reservoir or associated 
facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear 
River Development Act, if the failure to deliver 
the contractual amount of water is due to 
drought, other natural condition, or safety con-
dition that causes a deficiency in the amount of 
available water. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 5; Laws 1975, c. 189, 
§ 1; Laws 1978, c. 27, § 4; Laws 1983, c 129, 
§ 4, Laws 1985, c. 82, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 251, 
§ 1. 
See now, § 63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions 
involving property 
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for the recovery of any property 
real or personal or for the possession thereof or 
to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages 
or other hens thereon or to determine any ad-
verse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication 
touching any mortgage or other lien said entity 
may have or claim on the property involved. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 6/ 
See, now, § '63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for negligent 
damage, destruction or loss of seized property 
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived as to any claim based on the 
negligent destruction, damage or loss of goods, 
merchandise or other property while in the pos-
session of any officer or agency of state or local 
government, including law enforcement offi-
cers, if the property was seized for the purpose 
of forfeiture under any provision of state law. 
Initiative B, adopted Nov. 7, 2000, eff. March 
20, 2001. 
§ 63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous con-
dition of highways, bridges, or other structures 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of 
the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmen-
tal entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side-
walk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 8. Laws 1991, c. 76, 
§ 2. 
See, now, § 63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury 
from dangerous or defective public building, 
structure, or other public improvement—Ex-
ception 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more'of 
the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmen-
tal entities is waived for any injury caused from 
a dangerous or defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 9; Laws 1991, c. 76, 
§ 3 . 
See, now, § 63-30d-301. 
§ 63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by negligent act or omission of employ-
ee—Exceptions 
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission off an employee com-
mitted within the scope of employment except if 
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
STATE AFFAIRS 
§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury—-Notice—Con-
tents—Service—Legal disability—Appointment 
of guardian ad litem 
(1) A claim arises when the statute ,pfj limita-
tions that would apply if the claim were against 
a private person begins to run 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring dur-
ing the performance of the employee's"duties, 
within the scope of employment, or tinder color 
of authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity ^before maintaining an action, 
regardless »of whe ther or not the'function giving 
rise tor the claim is characterized as governmen-
tal. 
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(I) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so 
far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or 
that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal 
guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim 
is against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is 
against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business adminis-
trator of the board, when the claim is against a 
school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, 
when the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public bpard, 
commission, or body. 
(4)(a) If, the claimant is under the age of 
majority, pr mentally incompetent and without 
a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the 
claimant may apply to the court to extend ' the 
t ime for service of notice of claim. 
(b)(i) After hearing and notice to the govern-
mental entity, the court may extend the time for 
service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an 
extension, the court shall consider whether the 
delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in main-
taining its defense on the merits. 
(d)(i) If an injury that may reasonably be ex-
pected to result'in a claim against a governmen-
tal entity is sustained by a potential claimant 
described in Subsection (4)(a), that government 
entity may file .a* request with the court for the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the 
potential claimant. 
j(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under 
this Subsection (4)(d), the time fort filing a claim 
under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins 
when the order appointing the guardian is is-
sued. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 11; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 5; Laws 1983, c. 131,' § 1; Laws 1987, c. 75, 
§ 4; Laws 1991, c. 76, § 6; Laws 1998, c. 164, 
§ L eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 157,.§ 1, 
eff. July 1,2001. 
See, now, § 63-30d-401. 
§ 63-30-12. Claim against state or its employ-
ee^—Time for filing notice 
A claim against the state, or against jts em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of the employee's duties, with,-
in the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not * the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 12; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 6; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 75, 
§ 5; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998. 
See, now, § 63-30d-402. 
§ 63-30-13. Claim against political subdivi-
sion or its employee—Time for filing notice 
A claim against a political subdivision, or 
against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of t he em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
or +mder color of authority, is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing body 
of the political subdivision according to the re-
quirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental 
Laws 1965, c 139, § 13; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 7, Laws 1983, c. 131, § 3; Laws 1937, c. 75, 
§ 6, Laws 1998, c. 164, § 3, eff. May 4, 1998. 
See, now, § 63-30d-402. 
§ 63-30-14. Claim for injury—Approval or 
denial by governmental entity or insurance car-
rier within ninety days 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim1 the 
governmental entity o r its insurance carrier 
shall act thereon and notify the claimant*in 
writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall 
be deemed to have been denied if at the end oof 
the ninety-day period the governmental entity of 
